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Abstract
We use the spreads of emerging market bonds traded in secondary markets to
study investors’ perception of country risk. Speci…cally, we ask whether investors
apply the “sovereign ceiling,” which says that no …rm is more creditworthy than its
government. To do this we compare the spreads of bonds issued by …rms to those of
bonds issued by the …rms’ home governments. We …nd several cases where a …rm’s
bond trades at a lower spread than that of the …rm’s government, indicating that
investors do not always apply the sovereign ceiling. Bonds for which this is true
tend to have substantial export earnings and/or a close relationship with either
a foreign …rm or with the home government. For countries with lower perceived
default risk, we …nd that investors do not believe that whenever the government
defaults, the …rm will default.
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In April 1997, the credit rating agency Standard & Poor’s made a controversial an-
nouncement. It upgraded the debt of fourteen Argentinian …rms, including three banks,
to a rating higher than that accorded to Argentina’s sovereign debt. This decision ran
counter to the “sovereign ceiling”rule, a long-standing policy of the credit rating industry
that no corporate debt can carry a rating higher than that of the …rm’s home govern-
ment. Moody’s, S&P’s principal competitor, argued that the move was irresponsible,
and many market participants agreed. One emerging market analyst stated, “It’s a can
of worms that S&P has opened up. They’ve blown their credibility.” (Euromoney 1997).
This debate reveals considerable disagreement about the nature of corporate default
risk in emerging markets. It is clear that in emerging markets, which country a …rm is
located in is one of the most important factors in determining its default risk. But there
is no consensus as to exactly why.
The sovereign ceiling may seem like a reasonable rule of thumb, as a …rst cut at
determining the credit risk of a …rm in an emerging market. Most companies are almost
certainly riskier than their governments. However the rule itself only matters when
it binds, and for companies whose ratings are constrained by the ceiling it has real
e¤ects. The investment policies of pension funds and insurance companies are tied to
credit ratings, so that ratings determine the pool of capital available to invest in a
bond. Even apart from bond markets, investors’ perception of country risk has important
implications for every type of foreign investment in emerging markets. Decisions about
bank loans, foreign direct investment, and portfolio investment in developing countries
depend crucially on how investors perceive the risks associated with the home country
of the borrower or project.
The sovereign ceiling rule is related to the common practice of using sovereign spreads
to impute the country risk associated with projects undertaken in emerging markets. One
popular way to incorporate country risk is to add a risk premium related to the sovereign
spread on to the cost of capital, under the argument that sovereign yield spread proxies
2
for the …rm’s country-related default risk.1 According to a survey conducted by Keck,
Levengood and Long…eld (1998), many practitioners add risk premiums into the discount
rates to adjust for country risk. Once the sovereign ceiling rule was abolished, the spreads
for the a¤ected …rms in Argentina narrowed by 30-50 basis points. If the sovereign ceiling
a¤ects the practitioners’ adjustment of cost of capital in emerging market projects by
50 basis points, then it constitutes an economically signi…cant constraint to emerging
market investment.2 Consider a project that yields an annuity cash ‡ow of $100,000.
With a 10% cost of capital, the project is worth $1 million. A decrease of the discount
rate from 10% to 9.5% would increase the present value of the project by $52632. The
method of accounting for country risk can thus have a big impact on what projects are
undertaken in emerging markets.
Broadly speaking, there are two justi…cations for the sovereign ceiling. One is simply
that a …rm and its government operate in the same macroeconomic environment. An
economy-wide downturn may lower the …rm’s prospects at the same time that it increases
the likelihood of a government repayment crisis. Likewise, a currency devaluation will
imply di¢culties for both the …rms and the government in meeting foreign currency
obligations.
A more direct explanation is that a country’s government has the power to tax …rms,
impose foreign exchange controls, or seize the …rm’s assets. If the government’s repay-
ment capacity falls, the government is more likely to exercise one or more of these rights,
which in turn will lower the …rm’s repayment capacity. We refer to this e¤ect as “transfer
1Another is to directly incorporate the potential sovereign risk impact on free cash ‡ows. See Bekaert
and Hodrick (2001) for a textbook example of the equivalence of the two. It should be noted also that
adding a risk premium to the discount rate only makes sense theoretically when country risk is non-
diversi…able. See Lessard (1996) for a discussion on the pros and cons of proxying for country risk
through the incorporation of sovereign spread into the discount rate.
2Only the fourteen …rms with credit ratings that were equal to the sovereign credit ratings found the
sovereign ceiling rule binding, and it is these …rms whose spreads subsequently narrowed. Similarly, the
presence of sovereign ceiling may only a¤ect the cost of capital for high-quality projects, which is likely
to be the case in many joint ventures.
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risk,” that is, the risk that a sovereign borrower’s repayment problems will be transferred
to the …rm.3 Transfer risk arising from the possibility of currency controls is the main
justi…cation credit rating agencies use for the sovereign ceiling. Euromoney (1997) cites
a senior analyst at Moody’s: “From our standpoint, it’s inevitable that controls would
be imposed on private companies” when a government defaults on its debt, while S&P
argued that this would be less likely in a dollarized economy.
In this paper we measure investors’ beliefs about country risk using corporate bond
prices for a panel of 108 …rms in emerging markets. Each corporate bond is paired with
a sovereign bond from the same country, enabling us to link investors’ beliefs about a
…rm’s default probability to their beliefs about the government’s default probability. We
use only bonds denominated in hard currencies, so that spreads above US bond yields
represent default risk, rather than currency risk.4 We use these data to examine the
sovereign ceiling in two ways. First, we simply compare the yield spreads of corporate
bonds to those of government bonds of similar maturities. In several cases, the corporate
spreads are lower, indicating that the market assesses a lower default risk for the company
than for its host government. The companies that command lower spreads than their
governments have substantial overseas revenue, are closely tied to foreign companies,
and/or are closely tied to the government.
We then use a more structured approach to examine the hypothesis that whenever a
government defaults, …rms in the country defaults. If this is true then a 1% increase in
the sovereign spread should imply at least a 1% increase in the corporate spread, all else
equal. To test this we regress the corporate yield spread on that of the government. For
countries with relatively low spreads (that is, those countries that investors perceive to
be relatively safe), we …nd that the coe¢cient on the government’s spread is less than
one, implying that investors view transfer risk as less than 100%. Thus investors seem
supportive of Standard & Poor’s decision. At least for some countries, …rms’ repayment
capacity is not believed to be completely restrained by that of their government.
3 IMF(1991)
4See Domowitz, Glen and Madhaven (1996), discussed below.
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Though there is an established literature on the determinants of sovereign repayment
capacity5 , very little research has looked speci…cally at the debt of …rms in emerging
markets. Eichengreen and Mody (1997) look at the determinates of debt prices for
both sovereign and corporate bond issues, but do not look at the relationship between
sovereign and corporate default. Ciocchini, Durbin and Ng (2002) study whether …rms
in countries that are more corrupt are subject to greater country risk. Domowitz, Glen
and Madhaven (1996) isolate the country and currency risks incorporated in peso and
dollar-denominated bonds issued by Mexican government. But they do not examine the
country risk impact on the …rms within the countries.
1. Data Description
Bonds became an important source of emerging market …nancing in the 1990’s. From
1991 to 1996, the dollar amount of long-term bonds issued in emerging markets grew
eight-fold, from $12.4 billion to $93.9 billion.6 By comparison, new equity issues grew
from $5.6 to $16.4 billion, and syndicated loan commitments, which were the traditional
vehicle of emerging market …nancing during the 1980’s, grew from $50.7 to $79.7 billion.
Our data set is built around the yield spread of corporate bonds paired with sovereign
bonds issued by the government of the corporation’s home country. We compute the yield
spread for a given bond by taking its yield and subtracting the risk-free interest rate for
bonds issued in the same currency. For example, given a dollar-denominated Mexican
bond maturing in …ve years, we compute the yield spread by subtracting the yield on a
…ve-year US Treasury bond.7
The markets for many of these bond issues are quite illiquid, and this is a source of
noise in the data. However, we contend that despite illiquidity the bond prices are a
rich source of information on investor beliefs about the default risk of individual …rms in
5For example, see Edwards (1984) and Boehmer and Megginson (1990).
6Euromoney Bondware (1997). Bonds considered here, as well as in our sample, are those issued in
hard currency.
7We use a …tted polynomial yield curve to …nd the appropriate risk-free yield.
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emerging markets. Because we have a time series for each bond, we can make side-by-side
comparisons of …rm and government default risk at the same date. Looking at a panel
also allows us to eliminate issuer-speci…c e¤ects, thus eliminating the selection bias that
a¤ects data on launch prices.
Because we use bond yields to measure the perceived default risk of the issuer, we do
everything we can to isolate the role of default risk in the pricing of the bond. We use
only Eurobonds issued in hard currency.8 We restrict our sample to the most standard
category of bonds: those that pay a …xed interest rate, have no collateral or third-party
guarantor, and contain no warrants or embedded options. Euromoney magazine identi…es
727 corporate bonds launched between 1980 and 1997 that meet our criteria.
We then attempt to match each corporate bond with a sovereign bond in the same
country (and meeting the same selection criteria). In the case of South Korea, which did
not issue any sovereign debt prior to 1998, we use bonds issued by the Korea Development
Bank as a proxy for sovereign debt.9 Other countries with substantial corporate borrow-
ing but little or no sovereign borrowing on the Eurobond market include India, Hong
Kong, and Singapore. For these countries we were unable to …nd an obvious substitute
for sovereign debt, so they do not appear in our data set.
The process leaves us with 659 corporate bonds. Of these, we were able to obtain time
series data from January 1995 to June 2000 for 116 corporate bonds and sovereign coun-
terparts. After eliminating some bonds that never traded during our sample period and
observations that were too close to maturity, eight of these were dropped.10 Where there
was more than one sovereign bond available, we chose the one for which the maturities
of the corporate and sovereign bonds are most closely matched.
8We consider only bonds issued in US, German, UK, Japanese, and Swiss currencies. Such bonds
constitute 95% of the international bond issues listed by Euromoney. To exclude the interest rate risk
associated with these currencies we look at spreads above risk-free rates; see below.
9Korean Development Bank debt is guaranteed by the Korean government, as outlined in Article 44
of the Korean Development Bank Act.
10One reason that we found so few series from Datastream is that they do not keep data for expired
bonds. About half of these 659 eligible bonds expired before we …rst retrieved the data in fall of 1998.
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Illiquid markets create two problems in using the data. One is the presence of liq-
uidity risk in the risk premium associated with the bond. While we will discuss this in
more detail later, for now we point out that on average sovereign issues are likely to be
more liquid, so that corporate spreads will overstate default risk by more than sovereign
spreads. A second problem is that because many bonds trade infrequently, the price we
observe is not always current. This leads us to drop some observations, as discussed in
Appendix A. Unfortunately, variables that would proxy for liquidity (such as bid/ask
spreads and trading volume) are not available. We will discuss the role of illiquidity in
more detail in the context of the results as we present them.
The home country of each …rm refers to the home country of the entity legally ob-
ligated to repay the bond issue; cases where the bond’s guarantor is di¤erent from the
issuing entity were eliminated from the sample. In some cases of …rms with foreign a¢l-
iates, however, legal obligations might not be the only consideration in case of default.
Unfortunately we do not have reliable data on foreign a¢liations, so we will not be able
to examine the role of foreign a¢liates in this study. We note that the sovereign ceiling
rule, as applied by the credit rating industry, does not take foreign a¢liates into account
either, but is based only on the legal home of the corporation. For example, Moody’s has
explicitly stated that Telefonica de Argentina’s debt rating should remain low despite
its ownership by Telefonica de Espana, arguing that it could not necessarily rely on the
Spanish company in the event of Argentinian currency controls.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for these 108 pairs of bonds. As we would expect,
…rms overall are riskier: corporate spreads are on average about 40% higher than sovereign
spreads. The correlation between corporate and sovereign spreads is positive and fairly
high, at 0.8. This is not too surprising and con…rms the intuition that country risk
plays an important role in emerging market corporate bonds. When we look at the
bonds by country and industry, we see considerable variation. Comparing Argentina and
Mexico, for example, we see that within our sample Mexican corporate debt re‡ects a
much higher risk premium over sovereign debt than does corporate debt in Argentina.
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Also, the covariance of sovereign and corporate debt is much lower in Mexico than in
Argentina. Note that Russia is an outlier in our sample, re‡ecting the collapse that took
place in 1998.
Looking at the industry breakdown, we see that oil & gas …rms in fact have lower
spreads, on average, than their host governments. The high average spreads for banks
are partly explained by a couple of Russian banks with extremely high spreads. The
bottom of the table shows average spreads by year. We see the e¤ect of the Asian crisis
in 1998 followed by a settling down of the markets by 2000.
Table 2 presents frequencies, by industry and country, both for bonds in our sample
and in the larger Euromoney data set. The industry distribution is fairly re‡ective of
the overall population of bonds: almost half of corporate bonds are issued by banks,
indicating that …nancial institutions play an important role in providing hard-currency
funds to developing country economies. Our sample is dominated by Latin American
…rms, in large part because Asian governments issue few hard-currency bonds. (Thus
there is not a scarcity of East Asian corporate bonds, but of sovereign bonds to match
them to). Countries outside of East Asia and Latin America represented in our sample
are South Africa, Lebanon, Russia, Czech Republic and Romania. From Table 2, we can
see that the only issuers of hard currency bonds in these countries are banks.
2. Do bond spreads re‡ect the sovereign ceiling?
In this section we compare the yield spread of individual corporate bonds to those of their
associated sovereign bonds. This provides a direct test of whether investors apply the
sovereign ceiling rule when evaluating a bond’s value. If a government and corporate bond
both promise identical cash ‡ows, then the sovereign ceiling implies that the corporate
bond should always be less expensive. If …rms are always riskier than their governments,
then there should be no instance in which a given corporate bond has a lower spread
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than a sovereign bond issued by that …rm’s home government.11
Of course in practice we do not have pairs of bonds with identical cash ‡ows. We
try to get as close as possible, by considering only bonds issued in hard currency and
by looking at yield spreads over risk-free rates. To avoid comparing bonds at di¤erent
points in the yield curve, in this subsection we consider a subset of our data (28 bond
pairs) for which the maturity dates are closely matched.12 All of these bonds are bullet
loans, so they do not have di¤erent amortization schedules.
Table 3a presents the mean …rm and government spreads for the 28 bond pairs in
our sample whose maturities are most closely matched to those of the sovereign. For 20
of the 28 bonds, the corporate spread is lower in at least one month. We do not read
too much into a small number of violations for a single bond, because of measurement
error arising from the bonds’ illiquidity. However, in a third of the cases the average
yield spread for the …rm is lower than that of its host government, and for six bonds
the di¤erence is negative and signi…cant at the 5% level. This is strong evidence that
investors do not believe Moody’s sovereign ceiling rule, since for an investor to apply the
sovereign ceiling rule means to never pay more for a corporate bond than for a similar
sovereign bond in the same country. On the face of it, these data imply that investors
believe some …rms are safer then their governments.
11We use spreads, though in most cases comparing the spreads is approximately identical to comparing
the yields; there will be a di¤erence when the bonds are issued in di¤erent currencies.
12Speci…cally, for this sample we consider only pairs of bonds whose maturities di¤er by less than
10%. That is, if t is the current date and Ti and Ts are the maturity dates of the …rm and sovereign
respectively, we require jTi¡TsTi¡t j < 0:1. Unlike the samples used for our regressions, we use the entire
time series available for each bond to compute these means. We also looked at the relative durations
of the bonds, to consider the impact of coupon structure on the e¤ective maturity of the bond. The
duration ratios were not substantially di¤erent from the maturity ratios.
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2.1. Is there another explanation?
To have con…dence that the results of table 3a re‡ect a violation of the sovereign ceiling,
we need to be sure that the di¤erences in spreads re‡ect only di¤erences in default risk,
and not other factors such as currency risk or liquidity risk. Therefore before going on
we will look more carefully at the bonds for which the sovereign spread is greater than
that of the corporate.
Table 3b presents more detailed characteristics of the eleven bonds for which the
sovereign spread is greater than or equal to the corporate spread. The maturity dates of
the bond pairs are listed; the corporate maturity and the sovereign maturity are all quite
close to each other due to our selection criteria. Note that in all but two cases (bonds
1 and 20), both bonds are denominated in US dollars. This means that di¤erences in
the underlying riskless security are not a factor in the di¤erence in yields, and also that
the result cannot arise from errors in the yield curve estimates (since the same estimate
is used for both bonds). For most of these bonds the coupon rates (and therefore the
durations) are quite close. For bonds 1 and 12 the sovereign bond has a much higher
coupon rate than the corporate bond, which is a possible explanation for the lower spread.
A serious concern is that because liquidity risk is an additional factor determining the
price of a bond, the bond spreads we use will not re‡ect pure default risk. If the corporate
bond is more liquid than the government bond, then the corporate’s lower spread may
re‡ect a di¤erence in liquidity rather than in default risk. Unfortunately our data do not
include good measures of liquidity, such as trading volume or bid/ask spreads. However,
we can report limited data on trading frequency. We have noted before that many bonds
in our sample do not trade on a daily basis. From Bloomberg, we are able to collect
data for 9 of the 11 bonds on whether each bond was traded on a given day. From this,
we calculated the fraction of days on which each bond traded over the sample period.
This is listed in table 3b. In six cases the sovereign bond traded at least as often than
the corporate bond, and in three cases (bonds 12, 13, and 19), the opposite is true. For
these three bonds, it is possible that the apparent violation of the sovereign ceiling is in
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fact driven by the greater liquidity of the corporate bond.
The fact that many bonds do not trade every day is a source of measurement error
in our data, since the spread may not re‡ect corporate and sovereign default risk at
the same moment. For example, suppose investors believe that the default probability
of both the sovereign and the corporate has increased during the month, but that no
one has traded the corporate bond for several days (while the sovereign bond has been
actively traded). Since our data list the last traded price during the month, at the end
of the month the quoted price of the sovereign bond will have fallen while that of the
corporate will be the same as before. The quoted price for the corporate does not re‡ect
current expectations, so it is possible that, even if investors see the corporate as more
risky, the observed spread on the sovereign is higher. This might bias the average spread
if there is a trend in the data or if periods of low liquidity correspond with jumps in
default risk.
To check whether this in‡uences our results, we re-compute the average spreads,
considering only those observations for which both the sovereign and corporate spread
are observed on the same day13. The results are included in the last two columns of
table 3b. In all cases, the result remains: the sovereign bond has a higher spread than
the corporate bond.
2.2. Why is the sovereign ceiling violated?
For …ve of the bonds in table 3b (numbers 3, 7, 8, 16, and 24), we can …nd no reason
for the sovereign ceiling to be violated, apart from lower perceived default risk on the
part of the corporate bond. Having identi…ed that the sovereign ceiling is violated in
several cases raises the question of why it might be violated. The main argument for the
sovereign ceiling is that a government faced with a payments crisis will impose currency
controls that make it impossible for …rms to obtain the foreign currency necessary to
13 In most cases, this means that both bonds were actively traded on the last trading day of the month.
But it could also mean (for example) that both bonds traded on the 15th and neither traded thereafter.
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repay their debt. If this is false, it is either the case that the government will not impose
(such severe) currency controls, or that these controls will not prevent the …rm from
making debt payments.
Looking at the companies listed in table 3b can yield clues as to why the sovereign
ceiling might be violated. The list includes two oil & gas …rms, three telecoms, a bank, a
steel producer, an electronics manufacturer, and a food company. Five are Argentinian
companies. This coincides with S&P’s relaxation of the sovereign ceiling in Argentina.
S&P justi…ed its move by the fact that Argentina’s economy had become largely dol-
larized. They argued that when the US dollar or another currency replaces the local
currency as the main instrument for transaction and savings, it would be much more
disruptive for the government to impose foreign exchange controls. The possibility of
government default without exchange controls is S&P’s ultimate justi…cation for decid-
ing the sovereign ceiling should not apply.
Another factor that might lessen the impact of exchange controls would be that a
company’s revenues are principally in foreign currency. Many of the …rms in table 3b have
substantial foreign currency earnings. Korean …rms Pohang Iron & Steel and Samsung
produce largely for export markets. Mexico’s Gruma is by far the largest seller of tortillas
in the US, and the US market represents 50% of its sales. Astra and Perez sell oil and
gas, which can be sold for hard currency. In fact, this argument - that export earnings
mitigate transfer risk - underlies the practice of explicitly guaranteeing loan payments
through securitizing future export revenues. Such securitized products are not subject to
the sovereign ceiling. For …rms that rely principally on export revenues, investors may
not require such an explicit link in order to feel con…dent that hard currency will be
available to repay loans.
By the same token, a …rm with substantial overseas assets is less vulnerable to gov-
ernment expropriation. Perez owns substantial exploration rights in Venezuela and Peru,
and Astra also has overseas assets. This could matter either as a potential source of hard
currency, or because creditors could attach these assets.
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Several of the …rms in our sample are a¢liated with foreign companies, and this may
constitute another reason for the sovereign ceiling to be violated. Mexico’s Gruma is
22% owned by ADM and involved in various joint ventures with the US company. At the
time of our sample, Telefonica de Argentina, Banco Rio de la Plata, Astra, and Telecom
Argentina were all partially owned by European companies. In the case of Telefonica
de Argentina and Banco Rio de la Plata, the …rms were eventually taken over by their
foreign a¢liate (Telefonica SA and Banco Santander Central Hispano respectively, both
Spanish …rms). Investors may expect that a foreign partner might take responsibility for
a debt issue in the case of sovereign default. Moreover, if investors anticipate takeover by
a foreign …rm, then they may ignore the sovereign ceiling simply because they expect the
…rm’s nationality to change. Moody’s does not consider foreign ownership in determining
whether to apply the sovereign ceiling, noting that the parent company is not legally liable
for the debts of a subsidiary. But investors certainly might expect the parent to honor
its subsidiary’s debts, if only for the sake of reputation.
A …nal reason the sovereign ceiling might be violated is close ties between the …rm
and its government. Korea Telecom is 40% government-owned, and Pohang Iron & Steel
is partially owned by the government and has a history of close ties to the government.
If investors see these companies as essentially part of the government, then default risk
would depend on government priorities. If the government sees telecommunication as a
“strategic” sector, for example, it might allow Korea Telecom’s bonds to be repaid even
if the government is in default.
None of these three explanations - hard currency revenue, foreign a¢liation, or gov-
ernment ties - is su¢cient to explain why the sovereign ceiling would be violated in all
the cases here. But they suggest factors that mitigate country risk.
Even if investors do not observe the sovereign ceiling strictly, the sovereign ceiling
seems like a sensible rule of thumb in most countries. The rationales described above may
apply only in “more developed” countries, in which all-out government expropriation of
private …rms is deemed less likely. Accordingly, we will next consider the possibility that
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sovereign risk is more important for …rms in some countries than in others.
To do so, we group countries into three di¤erent groups based on their “risk cate-
gories”. That is, we rank the countries in our sample by the average spread on sovereign
debt and divide them into three categories based on this ranking.14
Table 4 reports summary statistics for these three groups. Mean government spreads
in the “safest” category were 2.5, compared to a mean spread of 10.8 in the riskiest
category. Mean corporate spreads increase in step with mean sovereign spreads. The
correlation between sovereign and corporate spreads is also larger the riskier the grouping,
con…rming our intuition that there is more transfer risk in less-stable countries. We will
see that this carries through to the regression results below.
3. Transfer risk and the relationship between corporate and sovereign
spreads
Broadly speaking, a …rm can default for two reasons: because its income is insu¢cient
to repay its debt, or because the government prevents it from repaying. The sovereign
ceiling follows from the conviction that “…rms are always riskier than governments,” that
is, that these two sources of risk combine to make every …rm riskier than its government.
However, Moody’s justi…cation for the statement that …rms are always riskier follows
from the idea that “…rms will always default when the government defaults.” We refer
to this as the hypothesis that …rms face “100% transfer risk”.This implies that …rms are
always riskier than governments, and is certainly a justi…cation of the sovereign ceiling
rule, but is not implied by it. If the 100% transfer risk hypothesis is false, then it is
14Looking at the overall average of sovereign spreads would imply some selection bias, since some of
the countries in our sample appear only later in our sample period, when all emerging market bond
spreads were relatively high. We based our ranking on the mean sovereign spread from January 1999
to the end of our sample, though looking at other windows did not change the ranking much. The one
country that was a¤ected was South Korea, but changing South Korea’s categorization did not a¤ect
the regression results substantially.
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possible that the sovereign ceiling still makes sense, but that a very safe company could
hypothetically violate the rule. Under Moody’s justi…cation, no matter how great the
…rm’s repayment capacity, it can never be safer than the government.
In this section we argue that as long as the government’s and the …rm’s repayment ca-
pacities are not negatively correlated, 100% transfer risk implies that a 1% increase in the
government spread means at least a 1% increase in …rm spread (on average). To demon-
strate this, consider two bonds, a corporate bond (indexed by c) and a sovereign bond (g),
both expiring at the same date and with identical coupon rates. Each bond has a con-
stant probability of default in any given period, ±c and ±g , respectively. Let ±i represent
the probability that the …rms defaults for idiosyncratic reasons, unrelated to government
repayment. The statement that “the …rm always defaults when the government defaults”
implies that the corporate default probability can be written as ±c = ±g+±i(1¡±g). De…ne
sc (sg) as the spread of the corporate (sovereign) bond.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that the …rm defaults whenever the government defaults.
Then
dsc=d±g
dsg=d±g
¸ 1: (3.1)
The proof is in Appendix B.
The intuition behind this result simply comes from the fact that if transfer risk
is 100%, then the situations in which the government defaults are a subset of those
situations in which the …rm defaults. Thus if the probability of government default goes
up by 1%, this implies a commensurate increase in the probability of …rm default. This
logic extends to the …rm and government spreads as functions of default probabilities.
This does not rule out the possibility that in a given month the government default
risk increases, while at the same time the …rm’s idiosyncratic default risk falls. But we
argue that this is unlikely to happen consistently, since it is likely that bad news for
the government (for example, a decrease in economic growth) is also bad news for the
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…rm. The implied one-to-one relationship gives us a way to test for 100% transfer risk
by regressing changes in the …rm’s spread on changes in the government spread.
We will test the implications of this proposition directly in the next section. If we
…nd that there is less than a one-to-one correspondence between changes in sovereign
and corporate spreads, then it must be that 100% transfer risk does not hold. Notice
that it is quite possible that the default probability of the …rm is greater than that of
the government, but that there is not 100% transfer risk. Firm-speci…c factors may make
the …rm riskier than the government, even if the sources of risk are completely di¤erent.
If …rm-speci…c risk makes …rms generally less creditworthy than the government, then
the sovereign ceiling may make sense as a rule of thumb. Thus testing this relationship
is not a test of the sovereign ceiling per se, but a test of its justi…cation that “whenever
the government defaults, it will cause the …rms to default.”
4. Regression results
To test the 100% transfer risk hypothesis we will use the basic regression form
4sFit = ¯4sGit + uit (4.1)
where 4sFit is the change in the spread of the …rm’s bond from period t¡ 1 to period
t, and 4sGit is the change in the spread of the corresponding sovereign bond. By taking
di¤erences of the spreads, we control for any systematic …rm-speci…c component of the
…rm default probability. Inequality (3.1) implies that if the rationale for the sovereign
ceiling is strictly believed by investors, then we must have ¯ ¸ 1.15
15This regression is equivalent to using the di¤erence between corporate and sovereign spreads as the
dependent variable:
4(sFit ¡ sGit ) = °4sGit + uit:
¯ ¸ 1 in regression (4.1) is equivalent to ° ¸ 0.
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We emphasize that this is not a test of whether investors observe the sovereign ceiling
per se, but of whether they believe in a speci…c justi…cation for the sovereign ceiling, i.e.
that whenever the government defaults, the …rms default. A …nding that ¯ is less than
one would mean that investors do not believe in 100% transfer risk. But it does not rule
out the possibility that they still think every …rm is riskier than its government.
Ideally, we would want to compare corporate and sovereign bonds that have identi-
cal maturities. When we compared mean yield spreads, we limited ourselves to those
corporate bonds in our sample with a maturity very close to that of the corresponding
sovereign bond. In this subsection we use the entire panel of 108 bonds, and therefore
we will attempt to control for maturity di¤erences. If the yield curve is …xed over time,
the maturity di¤erence will represent a …xed e¤ect that will disappear when we take …rst
di¤erences. However, a …xed yield curve would be a very strong assumption. As a partial
correction, we allow a linear, time-varying yield curve.16 17
We now present results of the basic regression form
¢sFit = ¯¢s
G
it + '¢Z(t) + uit (4.2)
where ¢sFit is the change in the risk premium for …rm i in period t, ¢sGit is the change
in the corresponding sovereign risk premium, and ¢Z(t) is the vector of yield curve
16We do this by including a term which is a month dummy variable interacted with the maturity
di¤erence of the two bonds. Consider a pair of …rm and government bonds with yield spread sF;mit and
sG;nit where the …rm yield spread has m years to maturity and the government yield spread has n years
to maturity. We assume that the yield curve for all securities in period t is represented by:
s
G;m
it ¡ sG;nit = !t(m ¡ n)
Then we run the following regression:
¢sF;nit = ¯¢s
G;m
it + '¢Z(t) + ²it
where ¢Z(t) = Z(t) ¡ Z(t ¡ 1) and Z(t) = D(t) ¤ (m ¡ n) where D(t) is a month dummy.
17This assumption, while restrictive, is more general than existing literature. For example, Eichengreen
and Mody (1998) assume a linear yield curve that is constant over time. For our data, an F-test statistic
rejects the hypothesis that the yield curve is not time varying at 1% level.
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variables.
¯ represents the ratio of the …rm’s and sovereign’s sensitivities to events that a¤ect
the government’s likelihood of repayment. Note that we do not claim to be measuring
a causal relationship. Changes in sovereign bond spreads do not directly cause changes
in corporate spreads. Rather the two are in‡uenced by (some of) the same unobserved
factors.
Column (a) of Table 5 gives the results of this regression. The estimated coe¢cient
is greater than one, consistent with the predictions for 100% transfer risk.
In principle, each …rm has a separate ¯i: …rms are likely to di¤er in their sensitivity
to macroeconomic conditions and in the degree to which they might be taxed by the
government in bad times. In the previous regression we constrained all …rm ¯’s to be
equal. Next we will allow for di¤erent coe¢cients in di¤erent groups of countries.
We want to …nd out whether investor beliefs about transfer risk are di¤erent for a
relatively “safe” country than for a country perceived as more volatile. That is, we want
to consider the possibility that countries that are considered to be safer overall might
have less transfer risk by allowing for di¤erent coe¢cients within three “risk categories”.
Column (b) of Table 5 reports the results of the regression allowing separate coe¢cients
for the di¤erent risk categories. We now see that only the high-risk group has a coe¢cient
larger than one, and the coe¢cient for the other two risk categories are signi…cantly lower
than one, leading us to reject the hypothesis that investors believe transfer risk is 100% for
those groups of countries. This seems to con…rm S&P’s decision to abolish the sovereign
ceiling for certain countries.
These results are subject to two caveats. First, as we have discussed, our data su¤er
from measurement error due to the bonds’ illiquidity. This will tend to bias our coe¢cient
estimates toward zero. Unfortunately we do not have a very good measure of liquidity
and so no way to correct for this. However, we do not believe the extent of measurement
error is su¢cient to invalidate the results. Our coe¢cient estimates for ¯ are .52 for the
medium-risk group and .45 for the low-risk group of countries. For measurement error
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to account for the estimate that ¯ < 1, it would have to be that measurement error
accounts for roughly half of the variation in the change of the sovereign spread18, and
this seems extreme.
A second concern is that the bond spreads are capturing other sources of risk apart
from default risk. Changes in spreads could then re‡ect changes in these omitted factors.
One such factor is the liquidity premium. Another is pointed out by Elton, et al. (2001),
who show that for US corporate bonds, much of the spread re‡ects not default risk but
a risk premium associated with fact that expected default loss covaries with the stock
market. For our bonds default risk is much higher; many are rated below investment
grade. This leads us to expect that changes in default risk are the dominant factor in
determining changes in the spread. To the extent that the spread changes do re‡ect
changes in risk premia or the liquidity premium, these changes are likely to be positively
correlated. Whether this would bias our estimate upward or downward is ambiguous.
While we would like to use these data to test some of the hypotheses presented
in section 2 about why the sovereign ceiling might be violated, we do not have data
for the full sample on export earnings or foreign ownership. However we can allow
di¤erent coe¢cients for …rms in di¤erent industries. A summary from a practitioner’s
standpoint of the importance of industry sector is given in Copeland, Koller and Murrin
(2000), who note, “many country risks don’t apply equally to all companies in a given
country. For example, banks are more likely to be nationalized than retailers; or some
companies may bene…t from a devaluation (raw materials exporters) while others will
be damaged (raw materials importers).” In general, …rms should have greater country
risk if they are closely related to the government, serve the domestic market, or are
in procyclical industries. Examples would include utilities (with domestic cash ‡ows
and higher likelihood of nationalization) or the construction industry (which is very
18De…ne ¢sGit as the change in the default spread of the government bond, and suppose than instead
we observe ¢sGit = ¢s^
G
it +º it, where ºit is a random error in measuring the change in the default spread.
The “true” coe¢cient that we are interested in is given by ¯ = cov(¢s
G;¢sF )
var(¢sG) , whereas the biased estimate
is given by ^¯ = cov(¢s
G;¢sF )
var (¢sG)+var(º)
= ¯ var (¢s
G)
var(¢sG)+var(º)
.
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dependent on the domestic business cycle). Firms whose business is international and
whose revenues are in foreign currency, such as oil & gas …rms, would be expected to
have a lower level of country risk.
We are particularly interested in the banking industry. There are many reasons to
believe that country risk is closely related to the banking system (including the one cited
in the quote above), and many analysts feel that the sovereign ceiling is particularly
relevant to banks.19 Banks may face higher transfer risk if the government sees them
as the most readily accessible source for foreign exchange. The risk of a banking crisis
may also exacerbate country risk, as a …nancial crisis will make it more di¢cult for the
government and …rms to repay debt (cf. Mishkin (1996)). Krugman (1998) suggests
that this is the main factor behind the recent Asian crisis. If either of these e¤ects is
present, we should expect a stronger relationship between the risk premia of banks and
the government than between non-banks and the government.
To examine whether di¤erent industries have di¤erent country risk coe¢cients, we
run the regression
¢sFit = ¯0¢s
G
it + °
0Di¢sGit +'¢Z(t) + uit (4.3)
whereDi is a vector of dummyvariables describing industry groups and °0 = f°1; :::°j; :::°Jg
is the vector of industry coe¢cients.
Column (c) of Table 5 presents results from the regression with industry e¤ects.
Though the standard errors are large, we get some idea of how country risk di¤ers across
industries. The industries with the highest country risk include energy production (util-
ities) and construction, …rms with primarily domestic business. Oil and gas companies,
which sell on global markets and earn revenues in hard currency, tend to have lower
country risk. Telecommunication companies seem to have very low country risk, proba-
bly re‡ecting heavy foreign investment in this industry, as well as perhaps its strategic
19Euromoney (1997) cites an o¢cial with IBCA: “If there was a major recession, who would be hit?
The banks would have big bad loans. They’re in no position to be in a better credit rating than the
sovereign.” Note also discussion from Copeland, et al. (2000) above.
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importance to governments. An F-test examining whether country risks are the same
for all six industries strongly rejects this hypothesis. While the large standard errors
preclude us from drawing sharp conclusions about country risk for di¤erent industries,
this result suggests that for international capital budgeting purposes, incorporating the
same sovereign risk premiums to all di¤erent industries is likely to “overstate the risk for
some and understate it for others.”20
Column (d) of Table 5 presents the results for the regression including only the indus-
try e¤ect for banks or …nancial institutions. Surprisingly, the bank interaction coe¢cient
is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero; we …nd that banks do not have signi…cantly higher
country risk than non-bank …rms. This runs counter to our intuition and to conventional
wisdom, and we believe it merits further study.
5. Conclusion
There is a lack of consensus among credit rating agencies about how the creditworthiness
of …rms depends on their host governments. We study investors’ view of the question
by comparing the spreads of bonds issued by corporations in emerging markets to those
of their governments over the past 5 years. We …nd that sovereign and corporate bond
spreads are not consistent with the application of the sovereign ceiling: several …rms have
bonds that trade at a lower risk premium than that of their government.
We then look more closely at what determines how much corporate spreads depend on
sovereign spreads. In particular, we ask whether …rms in countries with lower perceived
default risk are less e¤ected by changes in sovereign spreads. To answer this we regress
changes in a corporate bond’s spread on changes in the spread of a bond issued by the
corporation’s home government. Though we …nd a strong relationship between sovereign
and corporate default risk, for relatively low-risk countries it is less than the one-for-one
response that we would expect if …rms faced 100% transfer risk. So while our results
indicate that market participants do believe that country risk is important, they do not
20See discussion of Copeland et al. (2001) above.
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believe the statement that …rms will always default when the government defaults.
This paper takes a …rst step in understanding the asset pricing implications of emerg-
ing market government on their …rms. Large emerging market companies typically consti-
tute major proportion of GDP in these countries. It is extremely important to understand
the factors that a¤ect their default risk. Understanding the risk factors underlying these
…rms also casts light on market …nance overall. Since …rms’ stock returns are driven
partly by their risks of …nancial distress, the government default risk should impact the
stock prices of these …rms as well. A future research project is to characterize the im-
portance of government bond yields on the stock returns in di¤erent countries. Beyond
looking at asset prices, a better understanding of government default risk is vital to
understanding both direct and portfolio investment in emerging markets.
6. Appendix
6.1. Appendix A (Dealing with bonds that do not trade)
The prices we use (taken from Datastream) represent the most recent traded price as
of the …nal day of the month (or in some cases an average of bid and ask prices). In
many cases, we can observe that the price of the bond does not change from one month
to the next, which we interpret as meaning that the bond did not trade at all in this
time.21 We eliminate such observations from the data set, so that every observation in
our data set represents a traded price from sometime within the last month. This is still
imperfect, since it is possible (for example) that for a given bond/month, we observe
the government’s spread as of the end of the month, but the corporation’s spread as of
the …rst of the month (if it did not trade at all for the next 29 days.) This problem
can be characterized as measurement error: at any point in time the observed price of a
bond will be an imperfect measure of investors’ current risk assessment. We discuss the
21Of the 108 bonds, there are 78 where either the sovereign or the corporate bond price stayed constant
in more than 10% of the months we observe, and in 27 cases one of the bonds did not trade in at least
half of the months we observe.
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implications of this in more detail when we report the results.
6.2. Appendix B (Proof of Proposition 3.1)
Proof: Assume that agents are risk neutral. Consider a bond expiring at time T , and
de…ne P0 as the initial price of the bond, fAtg as the promised stream of payments, and
r as the risk-free interest rate. The yield of the bond at time 0, y0, is then de…ned by
P0 =
TX
t=0
At
(1 + y)t
=
TX
t=0
At
(1 + r)t
(1 ¡ ±)t:
Given this, we can express the spread as s(= y¡r) = ± 1+r1¡± . we can rewrite the corporate
spread as
sc = [±i + ±g(1¡ ±i)] 1 + r
1¡ ±i ¡ ±g(1¡ ±i)
dsc
d±g
=
(1 + r)(1 ¡ ±i)
(1 ¡ ±c)2
dsg
d±g
=
1 + r
(1¡ ±g)2
Now, we can look at the ratio
dsc
d±g
dsg
d±g
=
(1 ¡ ±g)2
(1¡ ±c)2
(1¡ ±i)
Note that the denominator can be rewritten
(1¡ ±c)2 = [1¡ ±g ¡ ±i(1¡ ±g)]2 = (1¡ ±g)2(1¡ ±i)2
so we have
dsc
d±g
dsg
d±g
=
1
1¡ ±i
¸ 1
This says that, if investors believe that the corporation defaults whenever the gov-
ernment defaults, then a 1% increase in the government spread must be associated with
(more than) a 1% increase in the corporate spread, holding the …rm’s idiosyncratic default
probability constant.
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Table 1 
All statistics are based on yield spreads of hard-currency denominated bonds over risk-
free bonds of the same currency and same maturity. CORSPREAD refers to the corporate 
spread and GOVSPREAD refers to the government spread. Each corporate bond is 
matched to a single government bond in the same country. The sample is an unbalanced 
panel of 108 bonds from 1995:1 to 2000:6, representing 85 different firms. The sample 
does not include observations in which the price of a bond has not changed since the 
preceding month. 
 CORSPREAD GOVSPREAD  
 
Number 
of bonds Mean  SD Mean SD Cor(C, S) 
Total 108 5.44 9.25 3.87 4.68 0.79 
By country       
South Africa 2 1.97 0.54 2.39 0.57 0.57 
Argentina 29 4.24 2.72 3.76 2.06 0.70 
Brazil 22 4.99 3.80 3.90 2.81 0.65 
Mexico 22 4.44 3.27 2.57 1.41 0.41 
Venezuela 2 5.89 5.55 3.60 3.29 0.76 
Lebanon 1 1.88 0.81 1.79 0.42 0.64 
Indonesia 4 20.32 25.52 5.44 3.75 0.54 
Korea 7 3.00 2.43 2.86 2.12 0.81 
Malaysia 2 4.40 3.86 2.93 2.71 0.71 
Philippines 9 3.78 2.20 3.40 1.45 0.71 
Thailand 1 7.37 1.20 2.84 1.70 0.25 
Russia 5 26.53 31.96 16.88 17.07 0.90 
Czech Rep. 1 1.25 0.68 1.32 0.79 0.52 
Romania 1 10.73 17.29 8.72 13.71 0.97 
By industry       
Banking & Fin. 49 7.15 14.28 4.81 7.06 0.80 
Construction 8 3.66 2.63 2.50 1.41 0.49 
Energy/Utility 5 4.44 3.23 3.13 2.24 0.76 
Manufacturing 18 5.23 4.36 3.42 2.25 0.78 
Oil & Gas 7 3.65 2.04 3.94 2.01 0.77 
Telecom 10 3.88 2.36 2.79 1.55 0.77 
Other 11 5.07 3.58 3.75 2.06 0.24 
By time       
1995 14 7.07 2.58 5.86 1.39 0.06 
1996 64 3.82 2.13 3.00 0.85 0.53 
1997 105 2.41 1.55 2.09 1.08 0.47 
1998 100 7.40 12.77 5.25 7.98 0.71 
1999 70 9.16 14.77 4.91 6.03 0.58 
2000 49 4.76 3.80 3.29 2.26 0.56 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Distributions of bonds by region and industry 
 East Asia Latin America Other Total 
 Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Our sample          
  Banking & Fin. 5 10 34 69 10 20 49 100 
  Manufacturing 8 44 10 56 0 0 18 100 
  Energy/ Utility 2 40 3 60 0 0 5 100 
  Oil & Gas 1 14 6 86 0 0 7 100 
  Telecoms 5 50 5 50 0 0 10 100 
  Construction 0 0 8 100 0 0 8 100 
  Other 2 18 9 82 0 0 11 100 
  Total 23 21 75 69 10 9 108 100 
         
Euromoney 
data 
        
 Sovereign 84 13 245 40 294 47 623 100 
 Public 86 56 15 10 53 34 154 100 
 Banking&Fin. 744 45 643 40 251 15 1638 100 
 Manufacturing 141 42 162 49 31 9 334 100 
 Energy/Utility 59 36 52 33 49 31 160 100 
 Oil & Gas 39 21 125 68 20 11 184 100 
 Telecoms 23 32 45 64 3 4 71 100 
 Construction 25 37 42 63 0 0 67 100 
 Other 116 49 110 47 9 4 235 100 
 Total 1317 38 1439 42 710 20 3466 100 
 
 
 
Table 3 a 
Average spreads of bond pairs with similar maturities 
This table reports yield spreads of hard-currency denominated bonds over risk-free bonds of the same currency and same maturity. 
CORSP refers to the corporate spread and GOVSP refers to the government spread. Each corporate bond is matched to a single 
government bond in the same country. The 28 bonds here comprise all those in our sample for which the times to maturity of the 
corporate and sovereign bonds differ by less than 10%. The industries are: OG (Oil and Gas), BF (Banking and Finance), TC 
(Telecommunication), MN (Manufacturing), CN (Construction) & OT (Other). Diff refers to the difference in spreads (Corporate 
spread – sovereign Spread).  * means that the mean difference<0 at a 5% significance level. Fraction of months is the number of 
months when Corporate spread is lower than Government spread over the total number of months. 
    Country Industry Mean Mean Fraction of month Mean SE 
        Corsp Govsp Corsp < Govsp Diff Diff 
1 Astra – Compania Argentina de Argentina OG 3.14 3.14 12/32 0.00 0.23 
2 Banco Bansud SA Argentina BF 5.89 3.09 2/22 2.80 0.91 
3 Banco Rio de la Plata SA Argentina BF 4.62 4.74 47/66 -0.12 0.09 
4 Bridas Corp Argentina OG 4.02 3.34 3/17 0.67 0.44 
5 Compania Naviera Perez Companc Argentina OG 3.96 3.65 4/8 0.31 0.23 
6 Multicanal SA Argentina TC 5.95 4.96 3/36 1.00 0.23 
7 Perez Companc SA Argentina OG 3.73 4.12 29/42 -0.38* 0.12 
8 Perez Companc SA Argentina OG 3.16 4.51 17/17 -1.35* 0.19 
9 Sociedad Comercial del Plata Argentina MN 3.91 2.33 0/20 1.58 0.17 
10 Sodigas Pampeana / Sodigas Sur  Argentina EN 10.95 6.42 0/6 4.53 1.41 
11 Telecom Argentina STET-France Argentina TC 3.39 3.68 25/36 -0.29* 0.09 
12 Telefonica de Argentina SA Argentina TC 6.47 8.82 3/3 -2.35* 0.18 
13 Telefonica de Argentina SA Argentina TC 3.62 3.92 30/44 -0.30* 0.15 
14 Banco Real SA Brazil BF 4.4 4.11 3/15 0.30 0.65 
15 Daewoo Corp Korea MN 1.05 0.48 0/7 0.57 0.1 
16 Korea Telecom Korea TC 0.6 1.79 16/26 -1.19* 0.42 
17 Pohang Iron & Steel Co Ltd Korea MN 3.13 2.85 7/41 0.28 0.11 
18 Pohang Iron & Steel Co Ltd Korea MN 2.75 2.54 9/36 0.21 0.11 
19 Pohang Iron & Steel Co Ltd Korea MN 3.03 3.18 9/28 -0.15 0.17 
20 Samsung Electronics Co Ltd Korea MN 3.06 3.21 17/35 -0.15 0.2 
21 Yukong Ltd Korea OG 4.67 3.28 0/7 1.40 0.35 
22 Cemex SA de CV Mexico CN 5.83 3.71 0/7 2.12 0.05 
23 Empresas ICA Sociedad Controla Mexico CN 3.45 2.32 1/20 1.13 0.14 
24 GRUMA SA de CV Mexico OT 3.27 3.44 5/8 -0.17 0.31 
25 Grupo Elektra SA de CV Mexico OT 4.5 2.48 0/16 2.02 0.15 
26 Grupo Tribasa SA de CV Mexico CN 9.63 3.15 0/16 6.47 0.63 
27 Transportacion Maritima Mexica Mexico OT 3.26 2.65 3/22 0.61 0.13 
28 Transportacion Maritima Mexica Mexico OT 3.15 2.49 0/2 0.66 0.06 
 
 
 Table 3b 
Detailed Characteristics of bond pairs with similar maturities 
This table reports details of the bond pairs from Table 3a for which the sovereign yield is above the corporate yield on average over the sample. 
The characteristics of each sovereign bond are displayed immediately below those of the corresponding corporate bond. These characteristics 
included the currency denominations of the bonds, the coupon rates, the maturity dates, the starting and ending months, the total no of months 
within this window, the no of monthly observations included in the analysis, the issue amount in millions of dollars, the fraction of days in 
which a bond is traded in a given month, the number of observations where the two bonds are traded on the same days, and the mean corporate 
and sovereign spreads limited to those observations for which both prices come from the same day. 
  Country  Curr. Coupon Maturity Start & end Months in  Months of Issue amt  fraction of days Trade on same day 
     Date Months W indow Observations ($m) bond traded obs spreads 
1 Astra - Compania Argentina de Argentina $US 11.625 199912 9601-9904 40 32 100 n/a n/a n/a 
   Yen 7.1 199912    152 n/a   
3 Banco Rio de la Plata SA Argentina $US 8.75 200312 9501-0006 66 66 250 .53 31 3.89 
   $US 8.375 200312    1000 .91  4.10 
7 Perez Companc SA Argentina $US 9 200401 9701-0006 42 42 300 .87 37 3.59 
   $US 8.375 200312    1000 .99  3.90 
8 Perez Companc SA Argentina $US 8.125 200707 9707-9811 17 17 400 .87 15 3.04 
   $US 11 200609    1000 1.00  4.42 
11 Telecom Argentina STET-France Argentina $US 8.375 200010 9501-9805 41 36 500 n/a n/a n/a 
   $US 8.25 200008    100 n/a   
12 Telefonica de Argentina SA Argentina $US 11.875 200411 9501-9503 3 3 300 .68 2 6.59 
   $US 8.375 200312    1000 .29  8.94 
13 Telefonica de Argentina SA Argentina $US 8.375 200010 9501-9811 47 44 300 .96 20 2.45 
   $US 8.25 200008    100 .73  2.46 
16 Korea Telecom Korea $US 7.4 199912 9604-9806 27 26 100 .37 4 0.71 
   $US 8.65 200001    500 .67  1.30 
19 Pohang Iron & Steel Co Ltd Korea $US 7.375 200505 9706-0005 36 28 250 .76 22 2.89 
   $US 6.75 200512    200 .63  3.04 
20 Samsung Electronics Co Ltd Korea DM 5.375 200111 9703-0003 37 35 200 .18 3 0.80 
   $US 7.9 200202    500 .74  0.89 
24 GRUMA SA de CV Mexico $US 7.625 200709 9803-0001 23 8 250 .99 21 3.65 
   $US 8.625 200803    1000 .99  3.96 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
All statistics are based on yield spreads of hard-currency denominated bonds over risk-
free bonds of the same currency and same maturity. CORSPREAD refers to the corporate 
spread and GOVSPREAD refers to the government spread. Each corporate bond is 
matched to a single government bond in the same country. The sample is an unbalanced 
panel of 108 bonds from 1995:1 to 2000:6, representing 85 different firms. The sample 
does not include observations in which the price of a bond has not changed since the 
preceding month. Observations are weighted so that each firm receives a weight of 1 in 
each period; if a firm has n bonds, the weight for each bond is 1/n.  
Countries are grouped into three categories based on the average spread of government 
bonds. We rank countries based on the average government spread, and define the 
countries with the five lowest spreads as the "low-risk" group, the next five as the 
"intermediate risk" group, and the three with the highest spreads as the "high-risk" group. 
The countries comprising each group are listed as the last row of the table. 
 
 
Low-risk 
group 
Intermediate 
group 
High-risk group 
Number of 
observations 771 1517 172 
Corporate Spread    
  Mean 3.62 4.35 22.83 
  Std. dev. 2.93 3.06 29.95 
Gov. Spread    
  Mean 2.54 3.73 10.77 
  Std. Dev. 1.59 2.24 13.68 
Cor(C, G) 0.48 0.67 0.71 
No of Countries  5 5 3 
Countries 
Czech Rep., 
Korea, Mexico, 
South Africa, 
Thailand 
Argentina, Brazil, 
Lebanon, Malaysia, 
Venezuela  
Indonesia, Romania, 
Russia  
 
 
Table 5 
Estimates are based on monthly yield spreads of hard-currency-denominated bonds over risk-free 
bonds of the same currency and same maturity. The data set is an unbalanced panel of 108 bonds 
issued by 85 firms, from 1995:1 to 2000:6. The sample does not include observations in which the 
price of a bond has not changed since the preceding month, and does not include one bond that is 
an outlier. 
     The regression form used is 
 
DCORi t=b 0DGOVi t+gDi DGOVi t +öÄZt+ei t 
 
where DCORit refers to the change in the spread of firm i’s bond in period t and DGOVit refers to 
change in government spread for firm i’s home country. Di is a vector of dummy variables 
representing country risk level or industry category. Countries are ranked by average government 
spread and divided into three risk categories: the five lowest, the next five, and the three highest. 
ÄZt is a term that allows for a time-varying yield curve as described in the text. In some 
regressions Di includes the two risk level dummies representing the lowest-risk and highest-risk 
group (the middle group, which is largest, is excluded). The coefficients for these terms are 
g(GovLow) and g(GovHigh), respectively. Column (a) presents the basic regression results. For the 
regression in column (b), Di allows for different coefficients for countries in different risk 
categories. Column (c) allows for different country and industry categories (firms in industries 
classified “other” are omitted).  Column (d) reports the results including only the bank interaction 
term, as well as the risk level dummies. Observations are weighted so that each firm receives a 
weight of 1 in each period; if a firm has n bonds, the weight for each bond is 1/n. Robust standard 
errors reported. 
 
 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
b0 1.07 0.53 0.30 0.56 
SE (0.19) (0.07) (0.32) (0.07) 
g( Bank)   0.22 -0.04 
SE   (0.33) (0.12) 
g( Telecom)   0.17  
SE   (0.33)  
g( Construction)   0.48  
SE   (0.36)  
g( Energy)   0.42  
SE   (0.35)  
g( Manufacturing)   0.32  
SE   (0.34)  
g( Oil & Gas)   0.22  
SE   (0.37)  
g(GovLow)  -0.07 -0.06 -0.10 
SE  (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) 
g(GovHigh)  0.85 0.86 0.87 
SE  (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
Rsq. 0.34 0.39 0.39 0.39 
DF 2286 2284 2278 2283 
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